







































advantage, and compensating 
wage differentials for job 
routinization ad
serie




Los documentos de trabajo del Ivie ofrecen un avance de los resultados de las 
investigaciones económicas en curso, con objeto de generar un proceso de 
discusión previo a su remisión a las revistas científicas. Al publicar este 
documento de trabajo, el Ivie no asume responsabilidad sobre su contenido.  
 
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way 
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific 
journals for their final publication. Ivie’s decision to publish this working paper 
does not imply any responsibility for its content. 
 
 
La Serie AD es continuadora de la labor iniciada por el Departamento de 
Fundamentos de Análisis Económico de la Universidad de Alicante en su 
colección “A DISCUSIÓN” y difunde trabajos de marcado contenido teórico. 
Esta serie es coordinada por Carmen Herrero. 
 
The AD series, coordinated by Carmen Herrero, is a continuation of the work 
initiated by the Department of Economic Analysis of the Universidad de 
Alicante in its collection “A DISCUSIÓN”, providing and distributing papers 
marked by their theoretical content. 
 
 
Todos los documentos de trabajo están disponibles de forma gratuita en la web 
del Ivie http://www.ivie.es, así como las instrucciones para los autores que 
desean publicar en nuestras series. 
 
Working papers can be downloaded free of charge from the Ivie website 
http://www.ivie.es, as well as the instructions for authors who are interested in 










Edita / Published by: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit no.: V-1082-2010 
 
Impreso en España (febrero 2010) / Printed in Spain (February 2010)   WP-AD 2010-06 
 
Preferences, comparative advantage, and 










  In this paper I attempt to explain why labor economists typically have not been able to 
find much evidence on compensating wage differentials for job disamenities, except for risk of 
death. The key insight here is that, although workers need to be compensated when their 
preferences do not match the requirements for performing a job task, the occurrence of 
mismatch also decreases productivity, reducing the surplus to be divided between workers and 
firms, and decreasing wages. I focus on the match between workers’ preferences for routine jobs 
and the variability in tasks associated with the job. Using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal 
Study, I find that mismatched workers earn lower wages and that both male and female workers 
in routinized jobs earn, on average, 5.5% and 7% less than their counterparts in non-routinized 
jobs. However, once preferences and mismatch are accounted for, this difference decreases to 2% 
for men and 4% for women. These findings suggest that accounting for mismatch is important 
when analyzing compensating wage differentials.  
Keywords:  compensating wage differentials, preferences, comparative advantage, mismatch, 
routine 
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For more than thirty years, labor economists have been trying to find evidence of wage 
premiums for jobs that involve such disamenities as physical effort, routine nature of 
the work, or job insecurity. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, 
which goes back to Adam Smith and involves the framework of analysis outlined by 
Rosen (1974), workers must receive a wage premium for suffering from job 
disamenities, ceteris paribus. However, a survey of the evidence has concluded that 
“tests of the theory of compensating wage differentials are inconclusive with respect to 
every job characteristic except risk of death” (Borjas, 2005, Chapter 6, p. 224, italics 
added). 
It is obvious that on-the-job risk of death is an undesirable job characteristic, and 
the available empirical evidence indeed suggests that wages are positively associated 
with on-the-job risk of death (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). However, many other job 
characteristics are not regarded as intrinsically undesirable by all workers. Instead, the 
desirability of a large number of job attributes depends crucially on individual workers’ 
tastes or personalities. Smith (1979) notes that the heterogeneity of worker tastes make 
testing for compensating wage differentials difficult. 
At first glance, preference heterogeneity may seem consistent with mixed results 
for repetitive work. For example, Lucas (1977) finds evidence of significant 
compensation for repetitive work, while Brown (1980) reports a negative estimate. 
Almost twenty years later, the mixed results are even more striking. Daniel and Sofer 
(1998) present some such results in their paper. 
One straightforward way to account for preference heterogeneity when looking 
for compensating wage differentials is to run separate wage regressions for workers 
with different preferences. Still, as I show in the next section, non-routine-preferring 6 
 
workers earn lower wages in routinized jobs, which is contrary to what the theory of 
compensating wage differentials would predict. Therefore, preference heterogeneity by 
itself does not explain the puzzle of compensating wage differentials. 
Why, even after accounting for preference heterogeneity, are compensating 
wage differentials not observed or incorrectly signed? What if workers’ preferences for 
one type of job (or job attribute) are related to their productivity in performing that type 
of job? Workers’ tastes for a certain job attribute may correlate with their comparative 
advantage in such jobs. This is not the same as saying that preferences can have a direct 
effect on wages, independent of the type of job; i.e., workers with different preferences 
may have different absolute advantages in performing any job. Rather, the key insight 
here is that when workers’ preferences do not match job attributes, they are less 
productive. For example, non-routine-preferring workers are likely to be more 
productive in non-routinized jobs than routine-preferring workers. By the same token, 
routine-preferring workers are likely to be more productive in routinized jobs than non-
routine-preferring workers. 
If matching were perfect and each worker was assigned to a job according to 
comparative advantage, then the marginal routine-preferring worker would be willing to 
pay for working in a routinized job. Similarly, the marginal non-routine-preferring 
worker would need to be compensated for working in a routinized job. This would be 
consistent with the compensating wage differentials theory. 
However, as Lang and Majumdar (2004) pointed out, both casual empiricism 
and research show that matching is imperfect. More recently, Shimer (2007) 
acknowledges that skills and geographical location of workers are poorly matched with 
the skill requirement and location of jobs: unemployed workers are attached to an 
occupation and a geographic location where jobs with their skills are currently scarce. 7
 
Here, a similar point can be made. As I will show, a mismatch between workers’ 
preferences and job attributes does exist, and must be taken into account when looking 
for compensating wage differentials. Indeed, my findings indicate that not accounting 
for mismatch in wage equations could bias compensating wage differentials estimates. 
I propose a simple assignment model with Nash bargaining over wages for 
analyzing the role of mismatch when looking for compensating wage differentials. 
Assuming that observed workers are not in long-run market equilibrium, all workers, no 
matter what their preferences are, need to be compensated if working in the sector with 
a shortage of workers in the absence of pay differentials. However, only mismatched 
workers, who are less productive because their sectors do not match their preferences, 
are penalized. 
This simple framework offers a rationale for the existence of mixed estimates for 
compensating wage differentials. Indeed, in the literature the standard estimates may 
confound the effect on wages of the job attribute being analyzed with the one 
attributable to mismatch. 
This paper focuses on job routinization (i.e., jobs involving repetitive and 
routine tasks). I consider this is an important job attribute to study because estimates for 
it in the literature are mixed (e.g., Lucas, 1977, Brown, 1980, Daniel and Sofer, 1998). 
So, this analysis may shed new light on the sources of these mixed results. Furthermore, 
Table 1 shows that 29% of male workers and 36% of female workers report that “being 
able to do different things rather than the same things over and over” is “much more 
important than high pay”. Indeed, the Table indicates that variability of tasks is one of 
the most highly valued characteristics on the job for workers. This suggests that it 
should be easier to find compensating wage differentials for job routinization than for 
other job attributes. 8
 
Using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS), I find that 
mismatched workers earn lower wages. My results also indicate that accounting for 
mismatch is important in obtaining more reliable estimates of compensating wage 
differentials. On average, male workers in routinized jobs are paid 5.5% less than 
workers in non-routinized jobs, after accounting for: differences in completed years of 
education, IQ measured at high school, high school rank, adult cognition, tenure, 
occupation and firm size. This difference decreases to 4.5% after accounting for 
differences in the preference for routine work. Furthermore, controlling for mismatch 
reduces the difference in average wages between male workers in routinized versus non-
routinized jobs to 2%. For female workers, the difference decreases from 7% to 4%. 
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the puzzle. It 
presents a brief review of the compensating wage differentials literature, offers a 
description of the WLS dataset, and takes a first look at the data. Section 3 presents a 
model that sheds light on the puzzle. Section 4 offers the empirical model. My results 












2. The Puzzle 
2.1. A Brief Review 
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith noted that workers with the same level of 
competence should be paid different wages if their working conditions are different. 
Rosen (1974) formalizes Adam Smith’s ideas showing that, under perfect competition, 
identical workers need to be compensated for job disamenities. 
The standard method for testing the prediction of this theory is to estimate a 
wage equation with characteristics of the job ( ) and personal characteristics ( ).                     
In general, the equation is of the form: 
  ln                   (1)
The estimation of (1) using cross-sectional data identifies a market relationship between 
ln    and  . If the market relationship is linear, then   measures the marginal cost of 
the disamenity for any worker who is in his most preferred job in long-run market 
equilibrium. For an undesirable job attribute, the theory predicts that   0 . However, 
the empirical evidence on compensating wage differentials is mixed for job 
characteristics other than the risk of death (see Rosen (1986) for a classical discussion 
on the theory of equalizing differences). 
There have been several previous attempts at solving this puzzle. First, the 
estimates may suffer from selection bias: workers choosing a job with a specific 
undesirable attribute may have less distaste for such an attribute (e.g., Kostiuk, 1990). 
Second, working conditions are endogenously determined: richer individuals are more 
able to bargain over working conditions than poorer individuals (e.g., Garen, 1988). 
Third, omitted variables can also lead to biased estimates because of the correlation 
between unobserved skills, individual productivities, and the quality of working 
conditions (e.g., Brown, 1980, Duncan and Holmlund, 1983, Hwang, Reed and Hubard, 10 
 
1992). Fourth, when working conditions are reported by the workers themselves, the 
estimates are likely to suffer from simultaneity bias (e.g., McNabb, 1989). Further, if 
answers to survey questions about working conditions are given in subjective terms, 
then the estimates are likely to suffer from subjectivity biases (e.g., McNabb, 1989). 
Finally, when worker conditions are defined using average occupation (or industry) 
characteristics and then matched to individual workers, misclassification bias may arise. 
From an empirical perspective, in this paper I take into account most of these 
biases. First, I control for preferences in my wage regressions to account for selection 
bias. Second, I use IQ measured at high school and high school rank as proxies for 
unobserved skills and individual productivities, and occupation and size of firm dummy 
variables to account for characteristics other than job routinization (the job attribute 
under study) that may be related to worker productivities. Third, job routinization is 
measured by time spent doing monotone tasks in order to circumvent the problem of 
subjectivity biases due to the use of answers given in subjective terms. Last but not 
least, I measure working conditions at the worker level, not at the occupation level, to 
avoid misclassification bias. 
From a theoretical point of view, this paper can be thought of as looking at the 
consequence of the possibility that observed workers are not in a long-run equilibrium.  
I present a very simple model: workers are randomly assigned to jobs and wages are 
determined by Nash bargaining. The model highlights the effect of mismatch on wages, 
which must be taken into account when looking for compensating wage differentials. 
I start by presenting the implications of preference heterogeneity (about the 
attractive or unattractive features of performing a job task) for estimates of 
compensating wage differentials. Suppose there are two types of workers: those who 11 
 
enjoy   (  1 ) and those who have distaste for   (  0 ). In that case, to test the 
theory of compensating wage differentials, the following regressions should be run:  
  ln                            if       0   (2)
  ln                            if       1   (3)
If the theory is correct, I should find evidence on     0  and     0 : workers who have 
distaste for   (  0 ) are compensated for working in a job involving high levels of z, 
while workers who enjoy   (  1 ) are willing to pay for working in a job involving 
high levels of  . With these predictions at hand, I can assess the existence of 
compensating wage differentials for job routinization depending on workers’ 
preferences. Before taking a first look at the data, I provide a description of the dataset 
used in this paper. 
 
2.2. Data 
I use data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) of the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. The sample contains information on 10,317 men and women who 
graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957, approximately one-third of all seniors 
in Wisconsin high schools in 1957. It contains a rich set of self-reported information 
from sample members, siblings, and parents, as well as administrative data, collected in 
a series of surveys: 1957 (graduates), 1964 (graduates), 1975 (graduates), 1977 
(siblings), 1992-3 (graduates), 1993-4 (siblings) and 2003-5 (graduates and spouses).                 
I focus on the 1992-3 waves, when respondents were in their early fifties. This 
decision is based on both informational requirements and sample (size and selectivity) 
considerations. First of all, information on workers’ preferences is not available prior to 
the 1992-3 waves. Second, participation in the labor market is higher for people in their 
fifties (1992-3 waves) than in their sixties (2003-5 waves): 92.4% of men were 12 
 
employed in 1992 while only 47.8% of them were employed in 2004. Finally, this helps 
me to minimize non-random attrition problems.  
The WLS dataset offers an opportunity for exploring the role of mismatch in 
observing compensating wage differentials. It contains a set of individual characteristics 
obtained from the (graduate) respondents, such as IQ score measured at high school, 
high school rank, adult cognition, education, tenure, preference for job routinization, 
hourly wages, hours of work, number of hours performing different tasks on the job, 
etc. Moreover, the sample is quite homogeneous (high school graduates from Wisconsin 
high schools in 1957), which makes any concerns about omitted variables less 
important. 
My sample is restricted to workers who were employed in 1992. Unfortunately, 
employment status is missing for 1,824 individuals. This implies a dramatic decrease in 
the original sample size from 10,317 to 8,493. There are 7,196 individuals employed in 
1992. After restricting our sample size to those individuals having a positive hourly 
wage rate, the number of observations decreases to 6,756. Focusing only on Wisconsin 
residents, the sample decreases to 4,696. The sample also excludes individuals who 
were: working less than 20 hours per week, self-employed, employees of their own 
company, or family workers. Farm workers and members of the military also are 
excluded from my sample. After applying these restrictions, my working sample is left 
with approximately 3,800 observations. The presence of extreme values in the wage 
distribution was detected accidentally through the comparison of average wages for men 
and women. To avoid the estimates being driven by extreme values in the wage 
distribution, I trim the tails of the log-wage distribution at both the 3% bottom and the 
3% top. Finally, after dealing with missing observations for the variables used in the 13 
 
analysis, the working sample size is about 3,200. The next subsection presents the 
definition of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
2.3. Definition of the Main Variables 
The main variables in this paper are job routinization; worker’s preference for routine; 
and mismatch, i.e., the discrepancy between job routinization and worker’s preference 
for routine. In this subsection, I discuss how these variables are measured. 
The job routinization indicator ( ) —whether a job is classified as routinized or 
non-routinized— is constructed using the fraction of working time doing the same 
things over and over: job routinization is measured as 1 (routinized job) if the fraction 
of working time doing the same things over and over is equal to or higher than 0.5.               
Sensitivity analyses with alternative definitions of job routinization will be performed in 
the robustness checks section. I compute this fraction as the ratio of the number of 
weekly hours doing the same things over and over on the job to the total number of 
weekly working hours. Note that the reported number of hours can be compared across 
individuals; this addresses standard subjectivity bias concerns due to workers’ 
subjective assessments about working conditions. Moreover, the fact that the number of 
hours worked is reported by the workers themselves confronts the misclassification bias 
that is attributable to imprecise matching of average job (occupation or industry) 
characteristics to individuals whose job characteristics may depart (by and large) from 
the average characteristics within their occupation or industry. Of course, as in previous 
studies, simultaneity biases may exist: workers who are unhappy with earnings that they 
receive may also respond negatively when asked about job attributes (McNabb, 1989). 
The  worker’s preference for routine indicator ( ) —whether a worker is 
classified as a routine-preferring worker or a non-routine-preferring worker— is 14 
 
measured by the response to this question: “To what extent do you see yourself as 
someone who prefers work that is routine and simple?” The possible answers to this 
question are: agree strongly, agree moderately, agree slightly, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree slightly, disagree moderately, disagree strongly. This is one of the 
questions asked in scoring the Five-Factor Model of Personality Structure, and it is 
included in the personality section of the 1992-3 questionnaire, separate from job 
history or current/last job characteristics. Hence, the potential concerns about framing 
effects are minimized. For workers who agree strongly, moderately, or slightly, 
preferring work that is routine and simple,   1 . Sensitivity analyses with alternative 
definitions of worker’s preference for routine will be performed in the robustness 
checks section. 
Finally, mismatch between job routinization and worker’s preference for routine 
and simple work is measured as the absolute value of the difference between   and  , 
   ,    |     | . I adopt this approach because absolute value seems to be the most 
intuitive way of thinking about the discrepancy between two variables. Note that for 
binary indicators, the absolute-value deviation is equivalent to the quadratic deviation. 
 
2.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics of the WLS sample for currently 
employed individuals (1992-3). A first glance at the Table shows that, on average, male 
workers in non-routinized jobs earn $18.09 per hour, while male workers in routinized 
jobs earn $15.21: a difference of approximately $3 in the hourly wage. Women in non-
routinized jobs earn $11.41 per hour, while women in routinized jobs earn $9.33. 
Although these are unadjusted averages, workers do not seem to be compensated for job 
routinization. 15 
 
The Table also shows that the majority of men (52%) work in non-routinized 
jobs, while the majority of women work in routinized jobs (64%). At the same time, the 
fraction of workers who prefer routine and simple work is higher for women than for 
men: 0.24 versus 0.18. The fact that workers in non-routinized jobs are not compensated 
for job routinization is even more striking given that the supply of routine-preferring 
workers seems to be very low (24% of male workers, 18% of female workers) in 
comparison to the demand for them (48% of male workers, 64% of female workers). 
Can mismatch explain the apparent lower wages in routinized jobs? The 
percentages of well-matched workers (according to job routinization and preference for 
routine and simple work) are 62% and 53% for men and women, respectively. Hence, 
mismatch is higher for women (47%) than for men (38%). For both men and women, 
mismatch is very high. Moreover, mismatch may be responsible for (part of) the 
difference in average wages between routinized and non-routinized jobs: mismatched 
men are paid $15.51 per hour while those who are well-matched are paid $17.44 per 
hour. For women the difference is smaller: $9.61 versus $10.53. 
As expected, men are paid higher hourly wages than women: $16.71 versus 
$10.09. Not surprisingly, given the cohort under study, born around 1940, women on 
average are less educated than men.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of workers (by their preferences for routine and 
simple work) across jobs (by routinization) and the average hourly wages by worker-job 
type. Among men, 42% of non-routine-preferring workers are mismatched into 
routinized jobs (567/1359*100), while this percentage is 57 for women (758/1331*100). 
For both men and women, the percentage of mismatched workers is lower in non-
routinized jobs. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of men and women are 
non-routine-preferring workers (76% of men, and 82% of women). Regarding the 16 
 
average hourly wage, the Table describes an interesting feature of my data: there are no 
differences in average wages between mismatched and well-matched routine workers. 
Indeed, the differences are found only for non-routine-preferring workers. 
 
2.5. A First Look at the Data 
I start by measuring job routinization as the fraction of time at work doing the same 
things over and over. Routine-preferring workers (  1 ) are defined as those 
individuals who strongly agree, moderately agree, slightly agree, or neither agree nor 
disagree, with the statement “I see myself as someone who prefers work that is routine 
and simple”. 
Table 4 reports the degree of job routinization by occupational category for men 
and women, respectively. As the Table makes clear, “Professional and Technical 
Specialty Operations”, and “Executive, Administrative, and Managerial” occupational 
categories on average involve less routinization, while occupations such as “Operators 
and Fabricators” involve more routinization of tasks. Another interesting feature that 
emerges from this Table is that female workers tend to spend a higher fraction of time 
than male workers doing the same things over and over. In other words, women tend to 
do more routinized tasks than men within occupational categories. 
The results from Table 5 show evidence contrary to the theory of compensating 
wage differentials: workers with lower preferences for routine and simple work earn 
lower wages in the routinized jobs. Columns (2) and (4) show that both non-routine-
preferring male and female workers do not appear to be compensated for working in 
routinized jobs; rather, if anything, they appear to be penalized. For routine-preferring 
workers, columns (1) and (3), I find a positive but not statistically significant 
association between job routinization and hourly wages.  17 
 
The bottom line of Table 5 is that preference heterogeneity clearly matters, but 
in a surprisingly opposite way to what one would have expected from a selection-bias 
explanation: workers with lower preference for routine and simple work earn lower 
wages in routinized jobs. This paper provides an explanation for such a finding.  
Notice that the implicit assumption behind the prediction of a positive 
association between job routinization and wages for non-routine-preferring workers is 
that they must be compensated because of their higher disutility when working in 
routinized jobs. However, non-routine-preferring workers are likely to be less 
productive in routinized jobs. In other words, workers’ preferences are likely to reflect 
two things that are equally important for wage determination: their disutility from 
working, which will be higher as the discrepancy between preferences and job attributes 
(characteristics or job tasks) increases; and their comparative advantage on the job, 
which will be lower as the discrepancy between preferences and job attributes increases.  
If matching were perfect, and each worker was assigned to a job according to her 
comparative advantage, then the productivity effect of comparative advantage would 
not play any role: productivity would be the same for every worker, because every 
worker would be assigned to a job where her comparative advantage was maximized. 
However, matching is far from perfect, and neglecting its influence on wages is likely to 
confound the compensating wage differentials estimates. In other words, (2) and (3) 
would be mis-specified if mismatch also matters. 
Thus, a potential explanation for the puzzling results in Table 5 is that 
preferences for performing a job and the worker’s comparative advantage in performing 
it are (positively) correlated. If this is the case, then workers with lower preference for 
routine and simple work will earn lower wages in routinized jobs, not because they are 18 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
In this section I present a simple assignment model with Nash bargaining to show the 
effect of mismatch on the wage rate. The main purpose of the model is to show the 
importance of the mismatch productivity effect on the wage rate, and its relevance for 
understanding estimates of compensating wage differentials.  
There are two types of workers     0 , 1   , defined by their preferences for a job 
attribute (  0  for non-routine preferring workers,   1  for routine-preferring 
workers) and a continuum of firms’ types      0,1 , defined by the job attribute (  0  
for completely non-routinized jobs, and   1   for  completely  routinized  jobs).                  
Each firm is randomly matched with each worker:   ,   for each firm-worker pair. 
Then, the firm   and the worker   bargain over the division of the match surplus to 
decide the optimal wage.  
The profit function of the firm is given by 
         ,       (4)
where   is gross revenue (production), which depends negatively on mismatch    ,  , 
and   is the wage rate. The negative relationship between   and   is assumed on the 
grounds that the worker’s taste for a job attribute (e.g., routine-preferring worker) is 
likely to be positively correlated with his ability to perform well in a job with such an 
attribute (e.g., routinized job). In other words, a routine-preferring worker will tend to 
have a comparative advantage in doing repetitive things. Tinbergen (1975) sets a 
production function that depends on the extent to which a person’s abilities match those 





The utility function of the worker is given by 
            ,    ,     (5)
where   is the disutility from work, which depends positively on mismatch    ,   
between the job characteristic ( ) and the worker’s preference for such a job 
characteristic ( ), and on the job characteristic ( ). 
This random assignment setting can be understood by assuming that due to 
fractions the market is not in long-run equilibrium. This is a plausible assumption since 
the data suggest that mismatch is substantial: 18% of male workers are classified as 
routine-prefer workers, while 48% of them are working in jobs involving half (or more) 
of their weekly time doing the same things over and over. Hence, I assume that the 
routinized sector is the sector with a shortage of workers in the absence of pay 
differentials, 
    ,   ,   
    0 .  
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem is obtained from 
  max
 
          (6)
where 0   1   measures the firm bargaining power. 
The FOC gives us the optimal wage rate: 
      ,   ,             ,    ,     1        ,     (7)
The marginal effect of   holding   constant, which is the “standard” 
compensating wage differential, is 
       ,   ,   
  
  









However, the total effect of   holding   constant is 
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    0  from (8), 
    ,  
    0  if   0  (i.e., the higher is job 
routinization, the higher is the mismatch for a non-routine preferring worker), and   
    ,  
    0  if    1  (i.e., the higher is job routinization, the lower is the mismatch for a 
routine preferring worker).  
Equation (9) gives us precisely the effects being estimated as    and    in 
equations (2) and (3), in which   is omitted. What is the sign of 
     ,   ,   
    ,    ? The 
answer to this question is given by proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. When mismatch also affects gross revenue (output), it has an ambiguous 
effect on the wage rate. If the productivity effect dominates the disutility effect, then 
mismatch affects the wage rate negatively. If the reverse is the case, then mismatch 
affects the wage rate positively. If both effects cancel each other out, then mismatch has 
no effect on the wage rate. 
Proof.  
       ,   ,   
  
  
    ,   ,   
            
  
   1   
      ,   









1 Borghans et al. (2006) show that the effect of people skills on wages (in the 
equilibrium assignment) can be decomposed into two effects: first, workers with more 
people skills earn more because they generate higher (net) revenue (productivity effect); 
second, workers with more people skills take jobs where people tasks are more 
important and these jobs pay less, all else equal (compensating wage differential effect). 21 
 
4. Empirical Model 
My model yields three parameters that are captured in (11): a routine sector main effect 
(the “standard” compensating wage differential,  ); a routine-preferring worker main 
effect (the absolute advantage of this type of worker,  ); and a negative wage effect for 
workers who are in a sector other than the one they prefer (the negative productivity 
effect due to mismatch,  ). 
  ln                     ,       (11)
To identify the effects of   and  , I need to be aware of the possibility that the 
error term   is correlated with   and/or  . First, mismatch ( ) is likely to be correlated 
with worker’s ability: workers with worse skills are likely to be paid lower wages and to 
end up being mismatched. Second, the level of job routinization ( ) could be correlated 
with worker’s skills and skills requirements of the job: routine jobs are perhaps those 
requiring unskilled workers.  
I measure relevant worker’s characteristics that may be related to both wages 
and mismatch by education (completed years of education), IQ score measured at high 
school, high school rank, and an adult cognition measure which is based on eight of the 
fourteen items from the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). To account for the 
relevant characteristics of the job that may be related to both wages and job 
routinization, I control for occupation dummy variables (the 8 occupational categories 
are described in Table 4). Notice that once I control for occupation, the unique variation 
used to identify the wage premium/penalty associated with job routinization is within-
occupation variation. Further, I also control for size of firm dummy variables. Given 
this rich set of control variables (  ), it seems plausible to identify the effects of   and 
  by means of (12): 
  ln                     ,       Π    (12)22 
 
Finally, although I have a rich set of control variables that helps me to identify 
the effects of   and  , regression (12) contains worker’s preferences ( ), which may 
well be endogenously determined and thus may compromise the interpretation of my 
estimates: workers’ preferences are likely to be affected by their labor market 
experience. More specifically, an individual’s working experience on a particular job 
(tenure) is likely to affect his preferences for such a job. Although I do not have suitable 
data for assessing whether workers’ preferences change over time, I try to overcome this 
shortcoming by controlling for tenure: keeping tenure constant, the effect of preferences 



















5.1. Empirical Findings 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results on the effect of job routinization on wages for men 
and women, respectively. Column (1) in Table 6 shows that, on average, male workers 
in routinized jobs earn 11% less than male workers in non-routinized jobs. Once the 
worker’s preference for routine work is accounted for, this penalty is reduced to 10% 
(see column (2)). Column (3) shows that routinized jobs on average pay 7% less than 
non-routinized jobs when mismatch is controlled; on average, mismatched workers earn 
4% less than well-matched workers. Hence, if mismatch is not accounted for, the 
negative effect of job routinization on wages is overestimated. Indeed, once mismatch is 
included as a new variable in the wage regression, I can explain a substantial portion of 
the incorrectly-signed estimate for job routinization. 
While columns (1) to (3) control for worker heterogeneity, they do not account 
for job heterogeneity. In columns (4)-(6) I add both occupation and size of firm dummy 
variables into the previous specifications in an attempt to account for both kinds of 
heterogeneity. Notice that controlling for occupation is crucial to account for different 
skill requirements of the job. The results in columns (4)-(6) are qualitatively similar to 
those in columns (1)-(3): male workers in routinized jobs earn 5.5% less than their 
counterparts in non-routinized jobs (see column (4)). This penalty decreases to 4.5% 
once I adjust for differences in preferences (see column (5)). Finally, once workers’ 
preferences and mismatch are accounted for, this difference is reduced to 2% (see 
column (6)). Moreover, this is not statistically different from zero.  
Table 7 reports similar results for women. Accounting for differences in 
preferences slightly decreases the job-routinization wage penalty, from 10% to 8% 
(columns (1) and (2)), or from 7% to 6.5% (columns (4) and (5)). Again, adding 24 
 
mismatch into the model seems to be important: the effect of job routinization decreases 
from 8% to 3.5% (columns (2) and (3)), or from 6.5% to 4% (columns (5) and (6)). In 
none of the cases, the job routinization effect on wages is statistically significant once 
both preferences for routinization and mismatch are accounted for. Mismatched female 
workers earn 4% less than well-matched female workers. 
Overall, two features of the data stand out. First, mismatch is negatively related 
to wages. This is consistent with both my assignment model and Borghans et al. (2007): 
people are most productive in jobs that match their style, and they earn less when they 
have to shift to other jobs. Indeed, I find a mismatch effect after accounting for worker 
type (worker’s preference for routine work), job type (job routinization), and other 
observable characteristics at the worker, occupation and firm levels. Second, once 
mismatch is accounted for, the coefficient on job routinization is attenuated. The evident 
mismatch effect can explain a substantial portion (but not all) of the incorrectly-signed 
compensating differential for job routinization indicated in previous analyses. Indeed, in 
the models with occupation and size of firm dummy variables, the compensating 
differential for job routinization cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. In the 
next section, I perform several robustness checks to the use of alternative measures and 
the presence of outliers. Before presenting the results of my sensitivity analyses, it is 
important to discuss my results. 
 
5.2. Discussion 
My results show that accounting for mismatch explains a substantial portion (but not 
all) of the incorrectly-signed compensating differential for job routinization indicated in 
previous analyses. The fact that job routinization has still a negative sign could be 
reflecting that workers in routine jobs are less productive than workers in non-routine 25 
 
jobs. However, we control for different proxies for individual productivity such as 
education and IQ. Furthermore, in the most complete empirical models, the coefficient 
on job routinization is not statistically different from zero. 
Regarding the estimated effect of mismatch on wages, it must be recognized that 
this could be picking up two different kinds of effects. On the one hand, mismatch can 
have a negative effect on productivity due to the discrepancy between worker’s 
preferences for routine jobs and the variability in tasks associated with the job 
(Tinbergen (1975) sets a production function that depends on the extent to which a 
person’s abilities match those required in the execution of a job task). On the other 
hand, mismatch may reflect unobserved worker’s ability: mismatched workers could be 
less productive to start with. Unfortunately, I cannot disentangle these two effects in my 
paper. Nonetheless, the fact that mismatch must be accounted for in wage equations is 
an important one.  
Future research could benefit from such a framework using new and better data 
that may help to disentangle these two effects by using quasi-experimental variation in 
mismatch. For example, plant closing could be used as an instrument for mismatch to 
identify the effect of mismatch on wages for “workers who have been displaced from a 









6. Robustness Checks 
This section addresses some potential concerns about my previous estimates: the use of 
alternative measures of job routinization, routine-preferring worker and mismatch, and 
the sensitivity of OLS estimates to outliers. 
 
6.1. Alternative Measures 
The discrete approach to measuring job routinization and workers’ preferences is 
appealing because it is neat and clear cut. Unfortunately, it does not take full advantage 
of all the available information contained in my data. Moreover, the thresholds defining 
routine jobs and routine-preferring workers are arbitrary. 
In this subsection, I start by exploiting the variability in workers’ preferences 
and measures of job routinization. Here, job routinization is measured as a continuous 
variable; workers’ preferences are measured by several binary indicators; and mismatch 
is measured as it is in the rest of the paper. More specifically, the new job routinization 
variable is the fraction of working time doing the same things over and over on the job 
(as in Table 5). Workers’ preference for routine is captured by several binary indicators: 
Routine-Preferring Worker 1 (equal to 1 for workers who disagree strongly or 
moderately with the statement “I see myself as someone who prefers work that is 
routine and simple”, zero otherwise); Routine-Preferring Worker 2 (equal to 1 for 
workers who agree slightly, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree slightly with the 
previous statement, zero otherwise); Routine-Preferring Worker 3 (equal to 1 for those 
workers who agree moderately or strongly with the previous statement, zero otherwise). 
Tables 8 and 9 present the new estimates using these alternative measures of job 
routinization and workers’ preferences, where the omitted category is Routine-
Preferring Worker 1. The new estimates are very similar to the previous ones: the 27 
 
negative association between wages and job routinization decreases dramatically after 
accounting for worker’s preference and mismatch. The Tables also reveal a negative 
association between mismatch and wages for both men and women: on average, both 
mismatched female and male workers earn 3% less than their well-matched 
counterparts.    
I also check the sensitivity of my estimates to the thresholds defining routine 
jobs and routine-preferring workers. Now, I classify a job as routinized if the fraction of 
time doing the same things over and over is above the third quartile on the distribution 
of the fraction of time. And, a worker is classified as routine-preferring if his score on 
the preference for routine and simple work is above the third quartile on the distribution 
of preferences. The new mismatch measure is the absolute value of the difference 
between these new alternative measures. I provide new estimates with these alternative 
definitions for men and women in Table 10. The new estimates are very similar. 
For men, column (1) shows that workers in routinized jobs on average earn 7% 
less than their counterparts in non-routinized jobs. Column (2) shows that accounting 
for differences in preferences makes the wage penalty lower: almost 6%. Finally, adding 
mismatch into the model, column (3), decreases the wage penalty even further: 3%. 
Note too that being mismatched is associated with a wage penalty of 7%. Similar 
qualitative results are found for women in columns (4)-(6). 
 
6.2. Sensitivity to Outliers 
OLS estimates are known to be sensitive to outliers. In my analysis, I trimmed both the 
bottom 3% and the top 3% of the wage distribution in order to avoid the influence of 
extreme values. Here, I go one step further and perform a median Quantile regression 28 
 
analysis to make sure that my previous OLS estimates are not driven by extreme values 
of the wage distribution. 
The new (median) estimates reported in Tables 11 and 12 are robust to outliers 
and very similar to my previous OLS estimates. In Table 11, column (1) shows that, at 
the median, male workers in routinized jobs earn 11% less than male workers in non-
routinized jobs. Once the worker’s preference for routine work is accounted for, this 
penalty is reduced to 9% (column (2)). Column (3) shows that routinized jobs at the 
median pay 5% less than non-routinized jobs when mismatch is controlled. Mismatched 
workers earn 6% less than well-matched workers. Table 12 shows similar results for 
women, columns (1)-(3). 
To sum up, my results appear to be robust. Moreover, the rich set of covariates I 
consider in the WLS (education, IQ at high school, high school rank, cognition score, 
preferences, tenure, occupation type and size of firm) helps me to control to some extent 
for both workers’ and job’s heterogeneity. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the 
absence of comparable longitudinal information on job routinization and workers’ 
preferences as well as the absence of any valid instruments prevents me from arguing 











In this paper my goal has been to argue that previous estimates of compensating wage 
differentials are inconclusive because they do not account for the discrepancy between 
workers’ preferences and job attributes. Both casual empiricism and research results 
suggest that this discrepancy indeed exists. In my sample, 38% of the men and 47% of 
the women appear to be mismatched. 
I propose a simple assignment model with Nash bargaining over wages for 
analyzing the role of mismatch when looking for compensating wage differentials. 
Assuming that observed workers are not in long-run market equilibrium, all workers, no 
matter what their preferences are, need to be compensated if working in the sector with 
a shortage of workers in the absence of pay differentials. However, only mismatched 
workers, who are less productive because their sectors do not match their preferences, 
are penalized. If mismatch is not accounted, then the association between wages and job 
attributes may be picking up the correlation between job attributes, preferences, and 
mismatch. 
My empirical analysis uses the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) and 
focuses on job routinization (the fraction of working time spent doing the same things 
over and over). I report several findings. First, mismatch is negatively related to wages, 
which is consistent with the negative mismatch productivity effect dominating the 
positive compensating wage differential effect. Second, for both men and women, I find 
that the negative relationship between wages and job routinization is attenuated once 
mismatch and workers’ preferences are accounted for. The evident mismatch effect can 
explain a substantial portion (but not all) of the incorrectly-signed compensating wage 
differential for job routinization that previous analyses have indicated. 30 
 
In my view, this paper highlights the importance of accounting for mismatch 
when looking for compensating wage differentials. Clearly, much more work needs to 
be done on the theoretical front, for instance, by endogenizing mismatch. Nevertheless, 
I anticipate that as long as there are search frictions that ensure that some workers 
remain in jobs that are not optimal given the existing wage rates, the results of the 
assignment model presented here will generalize to a market setting. Given the 























Table 1: Percentage of currently employed individuals reporting that job 
characteristic is much more important than high pay, WLS 1992-3.
Job characteristic Men  Women
Being able to do different things rather than the same things over and over  29  36 
Being able to work without frequent checking by a supervisor 22  27 
Having the opportunity to get on-the-job training 18  25 
Having a job that other people regard highly 7  11 
Being able to avoid getting dirty on the job 2  6 
        


































Table 2: Descriptive statistics.  
Men Women 
Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean  SD 
 Hourly wage routinized jobs   800 15.21 4.98 1,111 9.33  3.46 
 Hourly wage non-routinized   865 18.09 6.10 637 11.41  4.19 
 jobs   
 Job Routinization    1,665 0.48 0.50 1,748 0.64  0.48 
 (z = 1 if fraction of weekly  
 worked hours doing the same  
 things over and over is equal  
 or higher than 0.5, z = 0   
 otherwise) 
 Routine-Preferring Worker   1,656 0.18 0.38 1,743 0.24  0.42 
 (Preference for routine and  
 simple work: x = 1 if   
 strongly/moderately/slightly  
 agree, x = 0 if   
 strongly/moderately/slightly/  
 disagree or neither agree nor  
 disagree)  
 Mismatch, |z – x|    1,656 0.38 0.49 1,743 0.47  0.50 
 Fraction of weekly worked   1,665 0.48 0.38 1,748 0.61  0.37 
 hours doing the same things  
 over and over   
 Preferences for routine and  
 simple work   
 Strongly agree  94 0.06 -- 108 0.06  -- 
 Moderately agree  162 0.10 -- 238 0.14  -- 
 Slightly agree  35 0.02 -- 48 0.03  -- 
 Neither agree nor disagree  6 0.00 -- 18 0.01  -- 
 Slightly disagree  59 0.04 -- 68 0.04  -- 
 Moderately disagree  447 0.27 -- 503 0.29  -- 






Table 2: (continued)   
Men Women 
Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean  SD 
Hourly wage mismatched    636 15.51 5.08 821 9.61  3.52 
workers 
Hourly wage well-matched   1,020 17.44 6.04 922 10.53  4.12 
workers  
Hourly wage    1,665 16.71 5.77 1,748 10.09  3.87 
IQ (measured at high school)   1,665 98.95 14.35 1,748 100.10  13.89 
High School Rank   1,543 41.59 27.03 1,636 57.04  27.21 
Education    1,665 13.44 2.19 1,748 12.93  1.71 
(years of completed education)
Adult Cognition Score    1,653 7.47 2.78 1,739 7.62  2.63 
(WAIS)   


























Table 3: Distribution of workers across jobs and average hourly wages by worker-job type, 
WLS 1992-3. 
     
(Number of observations)  z = 0   z = 1
     
Male     
     






  (792)   (567)
     






  (69)   (228)
     
Female 
      






  (573)   (758)
     






  (63)   (349)
     



























Table 4: Fraction of weekly worked hours doing the same things over and over by 
occupational category, WLS 1992-3. 
Occupational Category Men Women
Professional and Technical Specialty Occupations  0.27 0.46 
0.27 0.41  Executive, Administrative and Managerial Occupations
0.54 0.70  Sales Occupations 
0.63 0.65  Administrative Support Occupations (including clerical)
0.44 0.83  Precision Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations
0.79 0.86  Operators and Fabricators 
0.64 0.79  Service Occupations  
0.73 0.90 
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers, Laborers, Farm Operators, 
Farm Workers, and Related Occupations
          



























Table 5: Job routinization and wages by workers’ preferences
OLS estimates for men and women. 
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
Job Routinization = fraction of weekly worked hours doing the same things over and over 
Men Women 
Workers’ Preferences Workers’ Preferences
Routine Non Routine Routine  Non Routine
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Job Routinization  0.035 –0.082 0.004  –0.096 
(0.052) (0.024) (0.046)  (0.016) 
Completed Years of Education  0.044 0.032 0.042  0.016 
(0.016) (0.005) (0.015)  (0.006) 
IQ Measured at High School  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.004 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) 
High School Rank  0.000 0.000 –0.000  0.000 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.000) 
Adult Cognition Score  –0.005 0.004 –0.002  0.001 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006)  (0.004) 
Tenure  0.009 0.008 0.016  0.013 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) 
           
R
2  0.25 0.32 0.39 0.38 
Number of Observations  270 1,253 378 1,243 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions 


















Table 6: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
OLS estimates for men.  
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.107 –0.095 –0.068 –0.053 –0.045  –0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.021)
Routine-Preferring Worker  -- –0.073 –0.091 -- –0.056  –0.071
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.022)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.037 -- --  –0.031
(0.022) (0.021)
Completed Years of Education  0.049 0.049 0.048 0.033 0.033  0.033
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)
IQ Measured at High School  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.000  –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Adult Cognition Score  0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002  0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)
Tenure  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007  0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Occupation dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
Firm Size dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
                
R
2  0.27 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.36  0.37
Adjusted R
2  0.27 0.27 0.28 0.35 0.36  0.36
Number of Observations  1,523 1,523 1,523 1,520 1,520  1,520









Table 7: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
OLS estimates for women.  
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.100 –0.083 –0.034 –0.072 –0.064  –0.038
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.020)
Routine-Preferring Worker  -- –0.114 –0.157 -- –0.076  –0.099
(0.018) (0.021) (0.017)  (0.019)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.071 -- --  –0.037
(0.021) (0.019)
Completed Years of Education  0.047 0.046 0.045 0.022 0.022  0.021
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)
IQ Measured at High School  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004  0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Adult Cognition Score  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001  0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)
Tenure  0.015 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012  0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Occupation dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
Firm Size dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
                
R
2  0.31 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.45  0.45
Adjusted R
2  0.30 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44  0.44
Number of Observations  1,621 1,621 1,621 1,612 1,612  1,612









Table 8: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
OLS estimates for men.  
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.144 –0.125 –0.086 –0.071 –0.058  –0.029
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.027)
Routine-Preferring Worker 2  -- –0.052 –0.056 -- –0.046  –0.049
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032)  (0.032)
Routine-Preferring Worker 3  -- –0.081 –0.104 -- –0.061  –0.078
(0.022) (0.024) (0.021)  (0.023)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.046 -- --  –0.034
(0.020) (0.019)
Completed Years of Education  0.049 0.048 0.048 0.033 0.033  0.033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)
IQ Measured at High School  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.000  –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Adult Cognition Score  0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002  0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)
Tenure  0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007  0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Occupation dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
Firm Size dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
                
R
2  0.27 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.36  0.36
Adjusted R
2  0.27 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.35  0.36
Number of Observations  1,523 1,523 1,523 1,520 1,520  1,520





Table 9: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
OLS estimates for women.  
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.152 –0.126 –0.086 –0.106 –0.092  –0.068
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.025)
Routine-Preferring Worker 2  -- –0.075 –0.086 -- –0.047  –0.053
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028)  (0.029)
Routine-Preferring Worker 3  -- –0.110 –0.142 -- –0.073  –0.092
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018)  (0.020)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.051 -- --  –0.029
(0.019) (0.018)
Completed Years of Education  0.045 0.045 0.044 0.021 0.022  0.021
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)
IQ Measured at High School  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004  0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Adult Cognition Score  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001  0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)
Tenure  0.015 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012  0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Occupation dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
Firm Size dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
                
R
2  0.31 0.32 0.33 0.44 0.45  0.45
Adjusted R
2  0.31 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44  0.44
Number of Observations  1,621 1,621 1,621 1,612 1,612  1,612





Table 10: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
OLS estimates for men and women. 
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
Men Women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.071 –0.056 –0.030 –0.089 –0.072  –0.054
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.018)
Routine-Preferring Worker  -- –0.086 –0.070 -- –0.116  –0.114
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)  (0.018)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.067 -- --  –0.038
(0.019) (0.017)
Completed Years of Education  0.050 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.048  0.048
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)
IQ Measured at High School  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005  0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.000  –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Adult Cognition Score  0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004  0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)
Tenure  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015  0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
                
R
2  0.26 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.32  0.32
Number of Observations  1,523 1,523 1,523 1,621 1,621  1,621














Table 11: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
Quantile Median estimates for men. 
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.108 –0.088 –0.049 –0.044 –0.037  –0.016
(0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.027)
Routine-Preferring Worker  -- –0.074 –0.107 -- –0.068  –0.087
(0.025) (0.030) (0.020)  (0.026)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.060 -- --  –0.029
(0.030) (0.025)
Completed Years of Education  0.053 0.052 0.052 0.034 0.034  0.035
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)
IQ Measured at High School  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003  0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000  –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Adult Cognition Score  0.007 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.003  0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003)
Tenure  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006  0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Occupation dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
Firm Size dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
                
Pseudo R
2  0.16 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.22  0.22
Number of Observations  1,523 1,523 1,523 1,520 1,520  1,520










Table 12: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials.
Quantile Median estimates for women. 
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Job Routinization  –0.100 –0.089 –0.056 –0.070 –0.069  –0.037
(0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.024)
Routine-Preferring Worker  -- –0.134 –0.157 -- –0.074  –0.111
(0.021) (0.027) (0.022)  (0.025)
Mismatch  -- -- –0.060 -- --  –0.052
(0.026) (0.022)
Completed Years of Education  0.064 0.063 0.063 0.032 0.032  0.030
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)
IQ Measured at High School  0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004  0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
High School Rank  0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000  –0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Adult Cognition Score  0.001 –0.003 –0.002 –0.001 –0.003  –0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)
Tenure  0.016 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.014  0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Occupation dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
Firm Size dummy variables?  NO NO NO YES YES  YES
                
Pseudo R
2  0.20 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.30  0.30
Number of Observations  1,621 1,621 1,621 1,612 1,612  1,612
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